Application details are unavailable to investigators since being deemed private and confidential. – Resource Pooling

Obtaining evidence from the cloud provider. – Measured Service

Circumvention of virtual machine isolation techniques via code or bad actor. – Broad Network Access

Evidence correlation across one or more cloud providers. – Rapid Elasticity

Get-Content –Path \Server\FTPFolder\Logfiles\ftpfiles.log | Select-String “ERROR”, “SUCCESS”

This script uses the Get-Content cmdlet to read the contents of the file one line at a time, and then uses the Select-String cmdlet to search for the keywords “ERROR” and “SUCCESS” in the lines of the file. The Select-String cmdlet returns a collection of MatchInfo objects, each of which represents a line that contains one of the keywords. The resulting collection of objects can be further processed to generate a summary of the number of files that were successfully downloaded versus ones that failed.

This detail is important because it is the initial vector used by the threat actor to deliver the malvertising link to the employee. Understanding the characteristics of the phishing email, such as the sender, subject, and body, can help identify potential indicators of compromise and inform future security awareness training for employees. It can also help identify any gaps in the organization’s email filtering and anti-phishing measures that may have allowed the email to bypass detection. The other details, such as the alert identified by the cybersecurity team, the information from the email header, and the alarm raised by the SIEM, are important in the incident response process but may not necessarily provide insights into the root cause of the incident.

The headers typically contain important information about the file, such as the entry point, section headers, program headers, and various flags and attributes that describe the file format and its contents. The “-h” option in objdump displays a summary of the headers, including their names, virtual addresses, sizes, and other relevant information. This information can be useful in understanding the structure of the object file and how it is loaded and executed by the system.

1. Analyze the TCP/IP Streams in Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid).
2. Evaluate the behavioral indicators in Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid).

Analyzing the TCP/IP streams in Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) can help identify the network behavior of the executable file and provide details about the external IP address it attempted to connect to. This information can be used to investigate the IP address and determine if it is a known malicious address or part of a larger attack campaign.

Evaluating the behavioral indicators in Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) can help identify any malicious activities or behaviors associated with the file, such as creating a fake recycle bin folder, and provide insights into the intent and capabilities of the threat actor. This information can be used to develop a response plan and inform future security controls and policies.

The other options listed, such as evaluating the process activity in Cisco Umbrella, analyzing the Magic File type in Cisco Umbrella, and performing network exit localization in Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid), may also be useful in certain contexts but are less directly relevant to the information provided in the scenario.

The two actions that should be taken in the recovery phase of this incident are:

1. Remove vulnerabilities
2. Scan hosts with updated signatures

Removing vulnerabilities is an essential step in the recovery phase, as it helps prevent future incidents by addressing the root cause of the problem. The security team should identify and patch any vulnerabilities or misconfigurations that contributed to the incident and ensure that all systems and software are up-to-date and secure.

Scanning hosts with updated signatures can help identify any malware or suspicious activity that may still be present on the network. The security team should use updated antivirus software and other security tools to scan all systems and devices on the network, looking for signs of compromise or unauthorized access.

Verifying the breadth of the attack and requesting packet capture may be relevant in the investigation phase of the incident response plan but are less directly relevant to the recovery phase, where the focus is on restoring normal operations and ensuring that the network is secure.

1. Controlled folder access
2. Signed macro requirements

Controlled folder access can help prevent unauthorized access to critical data by restricting write access to specific folders on the system. This can help prevent malware or unauthorized scripts from modifying files and can limit the impact of a successful attack.

Signed macro requirements can help prevent malicious macros from running by requiring that all macros be digitally signed and validated before they are allowed to execute. This can help prevent unauthorized or malicious code from running on the system and can limit the potential damage of a successful attack.

Firewall rules creation, removable device restrictions, and network access control are all important security controls but are less directly relevant to preventing macro-based attacks like the one described in the scenario. These controls may help prevent other types of attacks or limit the spread of malware, but they may not be effective against macros embedded within files that are opened by authorized users.

An engineer should check the last hundred entries of a web server with the command sudo tail -100 /var/ log/apache2/access.log.

By checking the Apache access logs, an engineer can identify the requests that are being sent to the server and potentially identify patterns or anomalies that indicate a DDoS attack. The “tail” command is used to view the last few lines of the log file, and the “-100” flag specifies that the last 100 lines should be displayed. The “sudo” command is used to run the command as a privileged user, which may be necessary to access the log file.

Checking the server’s processes, checking the services on the machine, or checking the list of usernames currently logged in may be useful for other types of attacks or incidents but are less directly relevant to identifying the origin of a DDoS attack targeting an Apache server.

Here is an example script that will search a log file for the IP address of 192.168.100.100 and create an output file named parsed_host.log while printing results to the console:

This script uses the “grep” command to search for the specified IP address in the log file and the “tee” command to simultaneously write the results to a file named “parsed_host.log” and print them to the console.

You can modify the script to use the appropriate path to your log file and the IP address that you want to search for.

The two actions that should be taken by a security analyst to evaluate the file in a sandbox are:

1. Inspect file type.
2. Inspect file hash.

Inspecting the file type can help identify the nature of the file and its potential risks. Different types of files may have different levels of access and permissions on the system, and certain file types may be more likely to be associated with malware or other malicious activity.

Inspecting the file hash can help identify whether the file is known to be malicious or suspicious. The file hash can be checked against a database of known malware and indicators of compromise to identify any potential matches.

Inspecting processes, inspecting PE header, and inspecting registry entries may also be useful in certain contexts but are less directly relevant to evaluating a file in a sandbox. These inspections may be more relevant to analyzing the behavior and impact of a file that has already been identified as malicious.

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList

The missing entrance/exit logs suggest that the user profile associated with the workstation may have been deleted or modified, which could be a sign of malicious activity. The ProfileList registry key contains information about user profiles on the system, including the user profile associated with the Windows 7 workstation used for access tracking.

By checking the ProfileList registry key, the security specialist can confirm whether the user profile associated with the workstation has been modified or deleted, and can potentially identify any malicious activity associated with the modification. The other registry keys listed, such as HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Winlog and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon, may be relevant to other aspects of the system but are less directly relevant to investigating the missing logs in this scenario.

1. Modify the incident handling playbook and checklist to ensure alignment and agreement on roles, responsibilities, and steps before an incident occurs.
2. Implement an automated operation to pull systems events/logs and bring them into an organizational context.

Modifying the incident handling playbook and checklist can help improve incident response by ensuring that all team members are aware of their roles and responsibilities and that they follow a consistent and well-defined process. This can help reduce the latency in detection and escalation and ensure that all necessary steps are taken to mitigate and recover from the incident.

Implementing an automated operation to pull system events/logs and bring them into an organizational context can help improve the identification phase of incident response by ensuring that all relevant information is collected and correlated in a timely and effective manner. This can help reduce the time to identify and respond to incidents, improve the accuracy of analysis, and ensure that the correct information is gathered to prevent recurrence of the incident.

Formalizing reporting requirements and responsibilities, allocating additional resources for the containment phase, and improving the mitigation phase are also important considerations for incident response but may be less directly relevant to the specific issues described in the scenario.

Cause and effect.

Analyzing the cause and effect of the ransomware outbreak is critical to understanding the root cause of the incident and identifying the vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the organization’s security posture. This analysis can help identify the specific events, actions, or conditions that contributed to the incident and can inform the development of a strategy to prevent recurrence.

Motive and factors, impact and flow, and risk and RPN are also important components of incident response, but they may be less directly relevant to the goal of analyzing the cause and effect of the ransomware outbreak and identifying strategies for prevention.

/var/log/syslog.log

The syslog file contains system messages and is a common location for log entries related to authentication, network connectivity, and other system-level events. By checking this log file, the engineer may be able to identify more information about the error and determine the root cause of the problem.

The general log and shell log files are less directly relevant to troubleshooting authentication errors and are more commonly used for other purposes, such as monitoring script execution or system commands. The vmksummary log file contains a summary of system events and may be useful for monitoring system health but is less directly relevant to troubleshooting specific errors or issues with authentication.

1. Data and workload isolation
2. Anti-malware software

Data and workload isolation is an important element of the eradication phase because it helps prevent the spread of the threat to other parts of the network. By isolating the affected data and workloads, the security team can ensure that the threat is contained and cannot continue to propagate through the network.

Anti-malware software is also important in the eradication phase because it can help identify and remove any malware that may have been introduced to the network as a result of the inbound connection attempts. By scanning systems for malware and removing any identified threats, the security team can help ensure that the network is clean and that the threat has been fully eradicated.

An enterprise block listing solution, centralized user management, and intrusion prevention system may be important elements of the incident response plan but are less directly relevant to the eradication phase of this specific incident.

The main use of TCPdump is to analyze IP and other network packets. TCPdump is a command-line tool used to capture and display network packets as they pass through a network interface. It can be used to monitor network traffic, diagnose network issues, and capture network packets for further analysis.

With TCPdump, you can capture and display the contents of individual packets and filter the output to show only the packets of interest. You can also save the captured packets to a file for later analysis using other tools.

While TCPdump can help in troubleshooting and analyzing network issues, it does not have the ability to change IP ports, view encrypted data fields, or decode user credentials. Other tools may be more appropriate for these tasks, such as packet sniffers or decryption tools.

The unexpected changes and setting modifications on the workstation, coupled with the large data dumps on network shares, suggest that an attacker may have gained unauthorized access to the system and was searching for sensitive information. This is a common tactic in reconnaissance attacks, where attackers attempt to gather information about the target’s systems, applications, and data in order to plan and execute a more sophisticated attack.

There is no evidence of data obfuscation, log tampering, or brute-force attack in the scenario described. While these may be potential tactics used by attackers in other scenarios, they are not directly relevant to the information provided in this case.

Open the file in a sandbox environment for further behavioral analysis as the file contains a malicious script that runs on execution.

Shortcut files are commonly used by attackers to execute malicious scripts or launch malicious applications on a victim’s machine. By opening the file in a sandbox environment, the engineer can analyze the behavior of the file without risking infection to the endpoint. Sandboxes are isolated environments designed to run applications and files in a controlled environment that can prevent them from harming the host machine.

Quarantining the file, uploading the file to a virus checking engine, or deleting the suspicious email without analysis may not provide the necessary information to determine the nature and severity of the threat. It is important to analyze the file in a safe environment to ensure that any potential threats can be identified and mitigated.

From the artifacts described, the implied threat actor in this scenario is a malicious insider.

The fact that an authorized user in the HR department has accessed legal data daily for the last week, as well as the above average-size data dumps found in the legal department’s shared folders, suggest that a user with legitimate access to the data is abusing that access for malicious purposes.

This behavior is consistent with that of a malicious insider who has already gained access to the organization’s network and is using their authorized access to carry out an attack. Internal user errors, external exfiltration, and privilege escalation are less likely explanations for the suspicious activity, as they do not fully explain the pattern of access and the large data dumps.

To evaluate the malware-infected file and its behavior further, the logs of the Antivirus solution should be reviewed next.

The Antivirus solution is specifically designed to identify and detect malware on endpoints, and will typically log details about the malware, such as the file name, location, and behavior. By reviewing the Antivirus logs, an analyst can gain a better understanding of the characteristics and behavior of the malware, which can help to identify the scope of the threat and plan an appropriate response.

While the other logs mentioned, such as email security appliance logs, DNS server logs, and network device logs, may also provide valuable information in certain situations, they are less directly relevant to the analysis of a malware-infected file and may not provide as much detail about the malware’s behavior.

Firepower is a next-generation firewall (NGFW) solution that uses advanced threat detection technologies, including intrusion prevention system (IPS), file inspection, and malware protection, to monitor network traffic and identify threats. It also includes a feature called Advanced Malware Protection (AMP), which is specifically designed to detect and block malware, including command and control communication used by botnets.

By using Firepower, an organization can create policies to monitor network traffic for malicious behavior and generate alerts when command and control communication is detected. This can help to identify infected devices and prevent further damage from being done. While other network security solutions, such as the Cisco Secure Web Appliance (WSA) and the Cisco Secure Email Gateway (ESA), can also provide some level of protection against malware, they are not as directly relevant to the detection of command and control communication. The Cisco Secure Firewall ASA, while providing basic security features, is not as advanced as Firepower and does not include the same level of advanced threat detection technologies.

The messages.log file is a system log that records various system events and error messages, including kernel messages, service start and stop messages, and system error messages. This log file should contain information about the web-server crash, including any error messages or warnings that were generated leading up to the crash, as well as information about system resource usage, such as memory usage, which can help to identify the cause of the issue.

The other log files listed, such as /var/log/access.log and /var/log/httpd/access.log, are specific to the web-server’s access logs, which record information about web-server requests and responses. While these logs may be helpful in identifying web-server usage patterns, they are less likely to provide information about a system crash caused by memory issues. The /var/log/httpd/messages.log file is similar to the messages.log file, but is specific to the Apache web-server, so it may contain more detailed information about the web-server crash, but it should still be reviewed in conjunction with the system messages.log file.

Steganography works by slightly modifying the data in a way that is not noticeable to the human eye or ear, but can still be recovered using specialized software or techniques. For example, an attacker might use steganography to hide a malicious file within an image, which can then be distributed over the internet or sent through email without detection.

Steganography is considered an anti-forensics technique because it can be used to evade detection or analysis by forensic investigators, as the hidden data may not be immediately apparent without specialized tools or techniques. However, modern forensic tools can often detect and recover steganographic data, making it less effective as a means of hiding information than it once was.

From the information provided, it is difficult to determine specific indicators of compromise, but the two possible indicators based on the given information are:

1. Unauthorized system modification: The presence of an event in the event log that occurred 48 hours prior suggests that some activity or modification took place on the system at that time. This could indicate that an attacker gained access to the system and made changes, or that an authorized user made changes without proper approval or documentation.
2. Malware outbreak: While the slow performance on the internal share server is not necessarily a definitive indicator of a malware outbreak, it could be a symptom of such an outbreak. If the unauthorized system modification mentioned above involved the installation or activation of malware, that could explain the slow performance on the server. However, more information would be needed to definitively identify this as an indicator of compromise.

The other indicators listed, including privilege escalation, denial of service attack, and compromised root access, are not necessarily suggested by the information provided.

The term “transmogrify” does not typically refer to an anti-forensics technique in the context of cybersecurity. In general usage, “transmogrify” means to transform or change something in a significant or surprising way.

In the context of cybersecurity, there may be some creative or informal uses of the term to describe certain techniques or attacks, but there is not a widely recognized anti-forensics technique that goes by this name.

The other options listed – encapsulation, concealment, hiding, and file header manipulation – are all recognized techniques for concealing or disguising malicious files or data in order to evade detection or analysis by security tools or investigators.

Specifically, a disassembler takes a compiled binary file and converts it into assembly language code, which is a low-level programming language that is more readable and understandable than the binary code. The disassembler may also provide additional information such as the addresses of the various functions and variables used in the code.

The resulting disassembled code can be analyzed to understand how the program works, identify vulnerabilities, and look for signs of malicious behavior. Disassemblers are commonly used for reverse engineering and malware analysis.

Therefore, the function of a disassembler is to aid in performing static malware analysis.

The technique used to evade detection from security products by executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live operation is called process injection.

Process injection involves injecting malicious code into a legitimate process running on a system in order to evade detection by security products. This is achieved by exploiting the trust relationship between the operating system and the legitimate process, allowing the malicious code to execute in the context of the trusted process.

By using this technique, the malicious code can avoid detection by security products that are looking for specific behaviors or patterns associated with malware. Additionally, process injection can be used to bypass security measures that are designed to prevent unauthorized access or modification of system files.

Therefore, process injection is the technique used to evade detection from security products by executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live operation.

Steganography is used to conceal the existence of data within other seemingly innocent data, making it difficult to detect. The technique involves embedding the data to be hidden within the data of another file, such as an image or a sound file, in a way that the alteration is not noticeable to the human eye or ear.

By using steganography, attackers can hide malicious files within benign files, allowing them to bypass security measures that are looking for specific types of malware. This technique can be used to distribute malware or exfiltrate sensitive data without being detected.

Therefore, in the given scenario, the anti-forensic technique that was used is steganography.

• unauthorized system modification
• compromised root access

The slow performance of the internal share server and an event in the event logs from 48 hours prior may indicate that unauthorized system modifications were made, possibly leading to a compromised root access.